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Can species have capabilities, and what if they can? 
 
Introduction 25 
 
In the face of increasing human impact on the natural world, theorising about ecological justice or 
justice in human–nonhuman relations has become an emerging theme in political theory and its rise 
is of great importance (Dobson et al. 2009, 318–319). One approach that has attracted recent 
interest is the expanded or environmental capabilities approach (hereafter the ECA)1. It builds on 30 
the core ideas of Martha Nussbaum’s central capabilities approach but expands the community of 
justice to nonhuman beings and ecological systems and collectives. Nussbaum (2011, 157–159) 
acknowledges that the central capabilities approach enables adopting stances like that of the ECA, 
but she endorses limiting the capabilities-based approaches to humans and sentient individuals 
rather than expanding their application further. 35 
The inclusion of ecological collectives in the capabilities framework signifies a nearly 
paradigmatic change. While sentient beings are ‘subjects-of-life’ and non-sentient individual 
organisms have in common what can be called ‘an organismic life process’, systems and collectives 
are ontologically and epistemologically different. Collectives often have arbitrary or contingent2 
boundaries, and it might be hard to capture how the notion of harm, let alone injustice, should be 40 
applied to ecological systems. Thus, the ECA faces multiple challenges that arise from its 
theoretical aspirations. First, it should explain how the operation of an ecological system can be 
conceptualised in the language of functionings and capabilities. This explanation must also give an 
account on how such systems can be harmed in a sense that is morally relevant, rather than just in a 
                                               
1  For the initial articulation of this approach, see Schlosberg 2007. In this article, the ECA refers to the 
capabilities-based approach to ecological justice. This differs from the capabilities-based approach to environmental 
justice (for that application, see e.g., Holland 2008; 2012; Heyward 2011; Schlosberg 2012b). The latter emphasises the 
instrumental importance of environmental conditions for human flourishing. Some proponents of the capabilities-based 
approach to environmental justice reject the idea of capabilities-based ecological justice.  
2  Yet, the boundaries of some organisms are also very difficult to define: consider mushrooms, for example, or 
the microbial systems that inhabit human bowels. 
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sense in which harsh winter conditions harm the city roads (cf. Cripps 2013, 97). Second, if the 45 
approach wishes to make claims of ecological justice, it needs to describe the relationship between 
environmental capabilities and duties of justice, as well as address how the conflicts between 
various claims of justice are to be resolved. 
The ECA has addressed these challenges concerning ecosystems to some extent, but 
discussion on the status of species as wholes is practically non-existent. Passages mentioning 50 
species are scarce and unclear. Schlosberg (2007, 147–148) has noted that because individual 
specimens can live far apart in different environments, applying the notion of justice to a species as 
a whole is difficult. Yet he also lists species among entities that can have capabilities (Schlosberg 
2007, 153; 157). The status of species is an important question due to the increasing negative 
impact of human activities on the viability of species. The main objective of this paper is to address 55 
this gap in research and examine whether species can possess capabilities, that is, whether their 
operation can be conceptualised using the capabilities framework. The paper contributes to the 
discussion on nonhuman capabilities and provides a novel approach to species protection. As 
opposed to the initial work of Schlosberg (2007), I do not begin with the assumption that the 
applicability of capabilities terminology to a given entity necessarily entails that the entity merits 60 
considerations of justice. Such an assumption is not required in capabilities theorising (Robeyns 
2016), and I find it conceptually useful to separate these two issues for reasons that are discussed 
later in this work. 
This paper begins with a clarification on what I mean by species as wholes. In the first 
argumentative section of the paper, I characterise the ECA and the grounds on which it argues that 65 
certain kinds of ecological systems can have capabilities. In the second part, I proceed from those 
grounds and examine whether and how the notion of capabilities can be applied to species. This part 
comprises the main argument, namely that species have integrity in a sense that makes them 
potential possessors of capabilities. In the final section, I discuss the implications of the argument 
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that species can have capabilities. I point out that there are different ways to apply the 70 
environmental capabilities framework, and hence, the implications of the argument that species 
have capabilities depend on the chosen strategy. The conclusive section also suggests some topics 
fore future research. 
An important proviso is that I am concerned with applying the ECA to particular 
nonhuman groups rather than with defending all elements of the ECA. Justifications for the idea of 75 
collective capabilities can be found in existing literature (Ibrahim 2006; Schlosberg and Carruthers 
2010; Murphy 2014). Discussions exist also on the feasibility of doing justice to non-sentient 
nonhumans (e.g., Low and Gleeson 2002; Baxter 2005; Schlosberg 2007; Fulfer 2013) although it 
should be repeated that I do not make a commitment to the view that having capabilities necessarily 
entails the recipiency of justice. Rather, I begin with the assumption that the idea of nonhuman and 80 
collective capabilities merit at least further examination. The interesting question for me is whether 
they can be applied in the case of species as wholes. 
Before proceeding further, some clarifications must be made concerning what I mean by 
species and what kinds of entities they are. Literature on species ontology has produced manifold 
fine-grained definitions of species whose differences are important for ecology but less so for 85 
philosophers and political theorists. A major distinction between two different ideas of species is, 
however, important. Species can be understood either as taxa, categories in our mind that are based 
on particular patterns of recurrence in the appearance of organisms; or as evolutionary groups, 
biological entities (Hey 2001; for a more detailed species ontology, see Smith 2016). The existence 
of species as taxonomic categories depends on human distinctions, and these categories correspond 90 
to our perception-based ways of classifying them. Evolutionary groups, in contrast, exist regardless 
of human identification. They are harder to identify unequivocally, though: some groups appear 
alike, and there is exchange of genes between certain groups. Taxonomical categories can be 
understood as ‘hypotheses of the organisms that constitute evolutionary groups’ (Hey 2001, 329). In 
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many cases, the taxonomical categories correspond with the evolutionary groups, though there will 95 
always be borderline cases, and categories are open to corrections. For example, the Nile crocodile 
Crocodylus niloticus was recently ‘split’ in two when its west/central populations were identified as 
a separate species Crocodylus suchus (Grigg and Kirshner 2015, 11). 
 A distinction between taxonomical and evolutionary species concepts is essential. Many 
objections to the moral considerability of species rely on the taxonomical definition: the 100 
‘ontological objection’ holds that the species Polar bear cannot be harmed because it is only ‘a 
classification of a certain mammal, not an actual mammal or group of actual mammals’ (Taylor 
1986, 69). By contrast, I commit to species realism and consider species primarily as evolutionary 
groups, which is not subject to the ontological objection. When I discuss the real-world species, 
such as Black rhino(ceros), I assume that the Latin label sufficiently corresponds with a particular 105 
evolutionary group, i.e. the species name can be used to denote a particular evolutionary 
grouSpecies boundaries are not perfect and they do not need to be. Even the ‘individual’ of liberal 
political theory has a problem of boundary definition, given the amount of nonhuman organisms 
residing in and on human bodies. Boundaries can always be argued: what matters is that the beings 
of concern are definable relative to normative and political purposes (Fulfer 2013), and the 110 
existence of various protection policies shows this to be the case regarding species. 
 Another remark concerns the distinction between populations and species. It has been 
argued that populations are more proper candidates than species for our concern (Baxter 2005; 
Schlosberg 2007, 147–148). This argument mainly relates to the way in which species are (often) 
spatially dispersed. This fragmentation, however, is not a reason to reject the examination of species 115 
as wholes in political theory. Many indigenous peoples are fragmentarily dispersed, like the Sami 
peoples who inhabit several countries and of whom many live outside their area of provenance, the 
Arctic area of Sápmi. Yet such dispersion has not prevented community capabilities theorists from 
applying the capabilities framework to indigenous and alike collectives (Schlosberg and Carruthers 
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2010; Murphy 2014). 120 
 A detailed treatment of the species–populations differentiation has been presented by Brian 
Baxter (2005) as a part of his distributional theory of ecological justice as the fair distribution of 
environmental resources between humans and nonhumans. The precedence of populations over 
species in this theory of justice is based on three arguments: ontological, consequential, and 
conceptual (ibid., 128–129). The ontological objection was rebutted above; I will shortly address 125 
two other objections with relation to the ECA. 
 First, Baxter argues that prioritising species over populations has counterintuitive 
consequences. It could justify a mass destruction of individuals insofar as the species itself remains 
viable. Focusing on the protection only on the species level may also encourage ‘buck-passing’ in 
local arenas, increasing the risk that a single misjudgement about the viability of a species leads to 130 
its extinction. These concerns rely on two assumptions: that individuals or populations do not 
matter when species do, and that species and populations are the only possible objects of concern. 
The ECA rejects both assumptions: it expresses concern about ecosystems, collectives of specimens 
(on either the species or population level), and possibly individuals as well. A mass destruction of 
individuals is unjustified for multiple reasons according to this approach. A concern for ecosystems 135 
also minimises the risk of viability misjudgements and buck-passing: any given ecosystem requires 
concern, and populations are essential constituents of those systems. 
 Baxter also maintains that the ‘good of species’ can only refer to the existence of viable 
populations because it ‘is within these that the good of the kind of organism to which we are 
referring resides’ (Baxter 2005, 129). This view differs from that of the ECA which focuses on the 140 
integrity, rather than the good, of a given entity. In contrast to the systemic orientation endorsed by 
the ECA, Baxter approaches ecological collectives instrumentally: he attaches special weight to 
populations of endangered species but does it only because the fate of those species affects the 
welfare of their specimens and of other interconnected beings (ibid., 136). Such reasoning might not 
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satisfy those environmentalists who regard the extinction of a species a regrettable tragedy, even if 145 
the species was rather ‘useless’ for other organisms and the system in question. 
 With relation to the domain of ecological justice where Baxter and Schlosberg operate, I am 
doubtful whether populations are in any sense less problematic recipients of justice than species 
despite their spatial unitariness. It is unclear how justice considerations should deal with population 
dynamics. Population size, composition, and boundaries change often and sometimes rapidly so. 150 
Any single population may be lost due to splitting up, merging, or migrating, and not all such losses 
are regrettable even if they originate from human impact. In contrast, when a species loses its 
viability for anthropogenic reasons, that (if something) is certainly regrettable3. 
 Populations are not without importance even if the focus is on species: at a minimum, they 
have twofold derivative value. Populations are ‘middle-term members’ in the chain between a 155 
species as a whole and its individual specimens. Viable populations are a precondition for the 
survival, self-organisation, and self-maintaining of a species as a whole; and the other way round, 
the flourishing of individual specimens (of at least any sexual species) often presumes viable 
populations.  
 160 
Grounds for capabilities: ecological systems and integrity 
 
The capabilities-based foundation of the ECA can be traced to central human capabilities approach 
that was initially articulated by Martha Nussbaum. Both the human and nonhuman applications of 
the approach share the same conceptual framework of capabilities (opportunities to do or be 165 
something), functionings (realisations of capabilities), and flourishing that requires certain 
capabilities which in turn enable the actual realisation of one’s characteristic form of living. The 
‘Nussbaumian’ school of capability theorising assigns a focal role to a list of central capabilities that 
                                               
3  Admittedly, in some rare cases the anthropogenic eradication of a species might not be regrettable: consider a 
harmful virus whose eradication could protect human health and overall diversity of life forms. 
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are a precondition for a decent and truly human life and that define the conditions for minimal 
justice in a decent society (for a more detailed description of the relationship between capabilities 170 
and minimal justice, see Nussbaum 2011). Similarly, it is possible to think of central capabilities for 
various nonhuman beings to describe which opportunities and abilities are necessary for the 
flourishing of their kind. Nonhuman capabilities are species- and system-specific: the fullness of 
life of a squirrel or of a blue whale, let alone of an ecological system, involves very different things, 
and defining central capabilities for each being requires sensitivity to these differences. 175 
The ECA extends the capabilities framework by including ecological systems in the 
community of capability-possessors. A key area of inquiry for the ECA is to find out what impedes 
nonhuman entities from realising their potential and flourishing4 or maintaining their integrity 
(Schlosberg 2007, 148–151), and the inclusion of systems is essential for such considerations. This 
is not as radical a move as it might first appear. Ecological problems are essentially related to the 180 
malfunctioning of ecological systems. From the normative viewpoint it can be argued that 
atomising or ‘reducing’ nonhuman nature to individuals devalues certain life forms and their 
characteristic flourishing (ibid., 148). Concerns expressed by environmentalists or local people 
about the eradication of a fragile and unique forest area are not only about the suffering of 
individual organisms but about the destruction of a unique, interconnected system, a place, and a 185 
life process. Expanding the community of justice beyond individuals5 is a natural step for the ECA 
that wants to capture such worries in the language of capabilities and of ecological justice. This step 
also evokes new questions. What kinds of capabilities and functionings can ecological systems 
have, and can ecological systems or groups be harmed in a way that justifies their inclusion in the 
capabilities framework (so that the capabilities denote something else than just a mechanical-causal 190 
                                               
4  Schlosberg links integrity and flourishing by stating that maintaining integrity is a precondition for flourishing 
(Schlosberg 2007, 136–137). This does not mean that to have integrity, a being should be one that can flourish. Hence, 
it can be left open here whether talk about species flourishing is meaningful, although it can be noted that in our 
everyday language and even in some academic literature species do flourish. 
5  This expansion does not deny the standing of individuals. In this paper, however, I focus on the species as 
wholes, not their individual specimens. 
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relation between certain capacities and their realisation), let alone in the community of justice? 
The ECA proposes that the central notion in answering the above questions is that of 
ecological integrity, which refers to the agency and autonomy through which nonhuman nature can 
develop, self-correct and self-regulate itself: that is, the attributes that make living beings and 
processes autonomous, able to maintain their existence and reproduce in changing circumstances6.A 195 
being that has autonomy or autopoietic capacities can maintain its organisation in the face of 
external forces and seek to maintain its integrity (Heyd 2005, 5; Westra, Bosselmann and Westra 
2012). Ecosystem sciences provide a largely similar definition of integrity: it denotes the autonomy, 
self-organisation, and self-correcting capacities of an ecosystem; it comprises the functionings and 
qualities of a system; and it refers to an undivided and complete state of a system (Müller, 200 
Hoffmann-Kroll and Wiggering 2000). The ECA maintains that the integrity of an ecological 
system can be harmed or interrupted by human actions (Schlosberg 2007, 149; 2014, 81; Fulfer 
2013), and this is also an instance of ecological injustice. The amount of harm that counts as 
injustice is unclear, though, because of ecological resilience: ecosystems can absorb a certain 
amount of disruptions before changing their essential structures (Berkes, Folke and Colding 2000).  205 
Although grounding the moral status or the capabilities of entities on their integrity is not a 
common strategy in the capabilities theorising,7 the notion of integrity has gained footing in 
normative environmental theorising. Harming ecological integrity is morally wrong (e.g., Leopold 
1949; Westra, Bosselmann and Westra 2012; Achterberg 1993) or constitutes an injustice (Low and 
Gleeson 1998; Schlosberg 2007; 2014). It has even been argued that integrity ‘represents the idea of 210 
noninterruption of functioning, which is, ultimately, what Nussbaum sees as the essence of justice’ 
                                               
6  This should not be confused with Nussbaum’s capability to bodily integrity, which is an entitlement of humans 
and sentient nonhumans against violence, abuse, and harmful treatment that prevents a being from flourishing in a way 
characteristic of its kind (Nussbaum 2006, 395–396). The capability to bodily integrity exemplifies a case where there is 
a vague line between a capability and a functioning realised by it: bodily integrity also refers to a state of intactness. The 
fact that Nussbaum names bodily integrity as a central capability for nonhumans also amounts to the rebuttal of a recent 
argument that denies capabilities from nonhumans because they do not make deliberative choices between opportunities 
(Melin and Kronlind 2016): bodily integrity is not an issue of making deliberative choices. 
7  The ECA departs here from Nussbaum’s human capabilities approach where dignity has, at least earlier, been 
central in defining which entities are recipients of justice (see Bendik-Keymer 2014). 
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(Schlosberg 2012a, 175). Philosophical-ecological works on environmental management (Costanza, 
Norton and Haskell 1992; Westra, Bosselmann and Westra 2012; Westra 2016) have also pointed 
out how certain ecological systems and collectives have integrity that can be harmed in a way that 
bears normative relevance. Preserving integrity is essential for the existence and maintenance of 215 
these living systems. This enables constructing a conceptual link between the states of an ecological 
system and its capabilities. Integrity is a state or a functioning of an ecological system, and it should 
be possible to identify central capabilities (or at least one capability) that essentially contribute for 
creating or maintaining this integrity. It is worth noting that factors which comprise the integrity of 
a given ecological system are called capacities: integrity as a state of an ecological system and 220 
capacities that enable it are indeed conceptually closely linked. Can species be said to have integrity 
and capabilities in a relevant sense? The inquiry shall begin with the question whether species have 
integrity. 
 
Species integrity and capabilities 225 
 
Examining the status of species within the capabilities framework takes us then back to the notion 
of integrity that denotes, recall, the ways in which nonhuman nature can develop, self-correct and 
self-regulate8. Species as evolutionary groups have the capacities ‘of changing and being acted 
upon’ (Hey 2001, 328). Yet, at least some kind of capacity to change and be acted upon could be 230 
identified even in a lava flow or a raindroHence, the notion of integrity requires clarifying to 
advance the argument that species have integrity but, let say, lava flows or waterdrops do not (for it 
is not the case that we would like to attribute to them capabilities in a similar sense). 
 Development, self-regulation and self-correction are related to the capacity of an ecological 
system to change, which enables its continued existence in changing circumstances. Such capacities 235 
                                               
8  It must be noted that this notion of integrity is much broader than the one used in the discussions of ‘species 
integrity’ in molecular ecology, where species integrity essentially relates to their genetic and morphological integrity. 
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manifest in the adaptation of species through evolutionary time. Perhaps the most used example in 
teaching Darwinian evolution is the case of Biston betularia, the peppered moth (Majerus 2008). 
During the latter half of the 19th century, industrial pollution in the north-west region of England led 
to a relatively rapid change in the appearance of the peppered moth whose colouring turned from 
off-white to black as a response to the pollution-induced darkening of tree barks and other landing 240 
surfaces. This kind of evolutionary response is quite literally a form of self-correction in conditions 
where the old colouring becomes flawed from the viewpoint of not getting eaten. Many 
evolutionary responses are, of course, more complex and slower in time. 
 The emergence of new species and subspecies demonstrates a more transformative form of 
self-organisation9. To be capable of self-organization entails that the entities in question are capable 245 
of self-maintenance and self-regeneration without human support: this autopoiesis, ‘the self-
making’, is common to living systems, including species (Callicott 1992). Examples of the self-
organisatory capacities of species that lead to the emergence of new species and subspecies are 
numerous, whether we look at the emergence of Homo sapiens or the evolution of species within 
for example the crocodile lineage Crocodyloidea whose remarkably similar-looking antecedents 250 
date back to the era of dinosaurs (Grigg and Kirshner 2015). 
 Ecological integrity also presumes an entity to have a sort of ‘identity’. Although an 
ecological system or collective changes over evolutionary time, it can be identified as substantially 
same in a shorter time frame. This sameness is comprised by a particular set of features and 
functions that together make a given entity the one it is, rather than another one or interchangeable 255 
with another one. Consider the example of the Black rhino (Diceros bicornis), a critically 
endangered species known for its impressive horn. The Black rhino is different from and not 
interchangeable with other species, even those of rhinoceroses: it has its own characteristic traits, 
unique evolutionary history and genetic pool. Regrettability of its possible extinction owes to this 
                                               
9  This may appear to be in tension with the emergence of new species: what is the entity that regulates itself in 
the process of speciation? I do not see this to constitute problems to the notion, though. Even in the ‘emergence’ of new 
human beings, it is hard to say to whom the related autonomy should be attributed, to mother or the unborn child. 
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uniqueness or identity: this very species with its own history is permanently lost with the extinction.  260 
In summary, species manifest autopoietic capacities and integrity10 in manifold ways illustrated in 
the above examples. These capacities are very different from those manifested in lava flows or 
raindrops; thus, acknowledging the integrity of species does not create a risk that species and lava 
flows would merit a similar status in the capabilities framework. 
Having discussed how and in which sense species have integrity, it is now possible to 265 
address the aspect of capabilities, the abilities that enable or promote the realisation of integrity. 
Literature on biological and conservation sciences reveals at least one species-related notion that 
fits in the conceptualisation of capabilities with relation to integrity: adaptive capacity, the ability to 
respond to changes with adaptation. Evolutionary adaptation helps species survive stressful 
conditions and realise opportunities that result from anthropogenic climate change (Hoffman and 270 
Sgrò 2011). In the ocean environment, for example, climate change will affect the temperature, pH 
and other stressors, and the adaptive capacity significantly determines how likely a species survives 
these changes (Foo and Byrne 2016). The adaptive capacity of species depends on their genetic 
diversity, dispersal ability, and phenotypic plasticity11. These factors are to some extent internal to 
species and vary between them, but extrinsic factors like human influence may constrain adaptive 275 
capacity, narrowing down the extent to which it can be realised (Beever et al. 2016). 
Human activities reduce or constrain the adaptive capacity of species in many ways. The 
situation of upper montane trees (Garavito et al. 2015) demonstrates the interlinkedness of such 
impacts. Upper montane trees typically have a low adaptive capacity because they are thermally 
specialised, surviving only in narrowly defined conditions, and because the possibilities for 280 
migration in the high altitudes are scarce. These trees are threatened by climate change but it is not 
the only threat to them: other threats involve human-caused forest loss and overexploitation of trees 
                                               
10  It can be left open at this point whether the case that species have integrity actually convincingly justifies their 
standing in the community of justice. 
11  Phenotypic plasticity refers to the capacity of a certain genotype to exhibit different phenotypes (appearances) 
in different environments. 
13 
 
for human use. Together, these threats encumber the adaptive capacity of montane tree species to 
changing environmental conditions. 
Adaptive capacity is essential for the continued existence of a species over time. It is 285 
manifested through the functions of self-development, self-regulation and self-correction pertinent 
to species integrity, and it is one answer to the question of what a given species is able to do: is it 
able to respond to changing circumstances? For the reasons provided above, it can be proposed that 
species have a capability of adaptive capacity that enables or contributes to their overall integrity12. 
Let us now consider more closely four ways in which humans may harm the species integrity or 290 
related capabilities. 
When human activities cause the extinction of a species, the integrity of a species is 
irreversibly lost. Extinction evidently means the loss of potential for adaptive capacity. Human-
induced extinctions are the clearest case of the (and the most serious in their irreversibility) harm 
done to species. Many species have faced anthropogenic extinction and even more are threatened 295 
with it due to direct or indirect human impacts such as climate change and habitat eradication. The 
rapidity of changes diminishes the prospects for adaptive self-correction. Habitat losses result in the 
decline in the genetic diversity of a species and narrow down its dispersal abilities; changes in 
habitat conditions may also disturb the realisation of the phenotypic plasticity. These all amount to 
the erosion of the adaptive capacity (Foo and Byrne 2016; Beever et al. 2016). 300 
Extinctions are not the only instance of harm to species. An endangered species loses its 
integrity if its viability and capacity for self-maintenance without external assistance becomes 
undermined though it might be possible to revive the viability of the species through protection and 
assistance.13 On the other hand, many species are nowadays confined to a significantly smaller 
range than they historically occupied, yet they may still remain viable in the present conditions. Do 305 
                                               
12  I leave it open whether species may also possess some other capabilities. 
13  Consequently, a ‘Noah’s Ark’ strategy (protecting the species from extinction by keeping minimum viable 
populations in zoos or like reserves) is insufficient for protecting the species integrity. In such conditions, a species has 
already lost its capacity for self-regulative and self-maintaining processes (including adaptive capacities). 
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such cases represent a harm to species? The capability aspect helps address this question. If the 
adaptive capacity of a given species has been significantly reduced or narrowed by habitat 
confinement, it can be said that the capability and hence also the integrity of that species has been 
compromised: although the species may in principle remain viable in the present state, its capacities 
for adaptation and development in the face of any future changes are undermined. Evaluating the 310 
status of confined species in this regard should be done case-by-case and involve experts from 
conservation sciences. 
Another example concerns situations where a species can evolve and exercise self-
regulation and self-correction, yet it has to do that as a result of human-generated selection 
pressures. Human-generated selection pressures may be indirect (the case of the peppered moth) or 315 
direct (the breeding of domesticated animals). Whether this counts as harm to species depends on 
how such pressures restrict the future opportunities of a species. The selection pressure of the 
peppered moth was restricted and affected only populations in heavily polluted regions. The off-
white colour also became common again as soon as the amount of pollution decreased: hence, 
though human actions created pressure on the moth’s adaptive capacity, they did not seem to have 320 
permanent influence on it. In the case of dog breeding, the result has been the creation of a new 
subspecies whose genetic diversification and adaptive capacities have improved over time. In other 
cases, however, selection pressures may lead to adaptation at the expense of losing a significant 
range of opportunities for future evolvement. If human selection pressures lead to a significant 
reduction in the genetic pool of a species, it can perhaps be said that the species has been harmed 325 
because its opportunity to survive in a longer timeframe diminishes. This question however 
warrants further considerations which should employ experts from relevant biological disciplines. 
It is not only climate change, nor habitat/resource eradication or maldistribution (that has 
been the primary concern in Baxter’s approach to ecological justice) that harm species. Black rhinos 
are poached for their horns, which is the main reason for its critical status. Poaching harms 330 
15 
 
individual beings but also the species as a whole when its specimens get dispersed into small pocket 
habitats, which diminishes the prospects for gene exchange and reproduction: both the self-
maintaining and adaptive capacities of the species are undermined. 
 
So what if species have capabilities?  335 
 
I have argued that species do have integrity and capabilities – at least that of adaptive capacity14 – 
and that their integrity and capabilities can be harmed in different ways. One of the main criticisms 
for the ECA has been that it has not provided a convincing account on why the integrity of 
ecological systems grounds them standing in the community of justice (Nussbaum 2011; 157–161; 340 
Cripps 2013, 96–99). Cripps has also problematised the notion of harm with regard to the 
capabilities of ecological systems with relation to harming. Building a dam is bad for a river system 
but not in a sense in which it is bad for a plant to be cut down; rather, it is bad in a sense in which 
wet summer is bad for the Edinburgh ice-cream business. Hence, Cripps argues, the applicability of 
the notion of harm does not justify the moral significance of ecological systems. 345 
 In the concluding section of this paper, I outline three possible strategies for answering this 
major criticism by introducing three different theoretical-normative roles species integrity and 
capabilities can play within the ECA. Since the main question of this paper is whether species have 
capabilities, it falls outside the scope of the present work to provide an examination of the general 
criticism of the ECA. Hence, I will delimit my treatment to this most pressing question. 350 
 The first strategy is to apply the ECA in a way that remains true to Nussbaumian origins as 
proposing an ideal theory of justice (ideal in the sense that the claims of justice are compatible with 
each other so that they can be fully met in a just society). Cripps (2013, 98) argues that this is a 
                                               
14  I hold that adaptive capacity as a central capability is common to all species as wholes. This leaves it open 
whether there would be a single set of capabilities that fits all species. Differing capabilities may emerge, for example, 
on the basis of different sexual reproduction methods, for they also define the ways in which genetic exchange and 
adaptation can occur. 
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prerequisite for making the ECA a viable approach to justice. In this strategy, integrity plays an 
essential and comprehensive role in the pursuit of justice: those beings that have integrity and 355 
related capabilities deserve considerations of justice, and arising claims of justice can be the object 
of an overlapping consensus15. Species have standing in the community of justice and this 
engenders related duties such as the duty not to undermine their adaptive capacity (and perhaps to 
support it to help adaptation). This strategy faces several challenges. First, it must explain why 
integrity grounds ecological systems standing in the community of justice. There is intuitive support 360 
to the view that the integrity of nonhuman life is morally regrettable. Many philosophers 
acknowledge that there is something intrinsically wrong in species extinctions16, wrong which 
cannot be captured by the notion of harm experienced by individuals or by the instrumental value of 
species (Schlosberg 2007; Baxter 2005, 4; Cripps 2010, 16). Species have also been argued to have 
a moral right to exist without anthropogenic extinction (Staples and Cafaro 2012) and to deserve 365 
protection for their own sake (Rolston 1985; Smith 2016). Hence, this task may not be hopeless17 
but it certainly requires further work. Second, to meet the conditions of an ideal theory, the ECA 
should formulate nonhuman capabilities in a way that erases the conflicting claims of justice, or 
define satisfactory principles for resolving such conflicts without compromising justice. It must also 
provide an account of the duties of ecological justice that is not impossible to fulfil. (Cripps 2010.) 370 
One solution would be to consider the duties of ecological justice as primarily negative duties of 
non-interference (Schlosberg 2014, 82–83). This is to some extent reasonable in the context of 
species that are ‘endowed with integrity’ they maintain unless substantially disrupted. Yet, humans 
may have already initiated the sixth mass extinction where many species have lost or will lose their 
integrity in years to come. It is unclear how this fact should be incorporated to an ideal theory of 375 
justice, but clearly merely negative duties of non-interference will not do the work. 
                                               
15  In Nussbaum's account the potential of overlaping consensus over central capabilities justifies them. 
16  In this paper, the term extinction refers mainly to anthropogenic extinctions, for they are relevant for 
ecological justice (justice in human–nature relations). 
17  It has also been pointed out in this paper that such a notion of integrity would not lead to the inclusion of (say) 
lava flows or waterdrops in the community of justice. 
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 The second strategy can be identified from Schlosberg’s response to the above critique. He 
maintains that the ECA endorses a non-ideal, problem-solving theory of justice: its goal is to 
illuminate the conflicts between justice claims and to help minimise injustice in human interactions 
with nonhuman nature (Schlosberg 2014, 83–85). As Schlosberg points out, conflicts between 380 
humans and the rest of the natural world are inevitable. Whereas in the first strategy it is the task of 
a political theorist to resolve such conflicts, Schlosberg argues that resolving them is a task of 
deliberative public sphere, where the ECA provides one viewpoint to contested issues (Schlosberg 
2014, 85–88)18. In this strategy, integrity plays an essential but incomprehensive role in the pursuit 
of justice: the claim that species merit considerations of justice because of their integrity need not 385 
be the object of overlapping consensus in this strategy. Still, this view also has the burden of proof 
to explain why integrity grounds the standing in the community of justice. It does not, however, 
need to erase conflicts between justice claims: they are subject to public deliberation. This strategy 
can also deal easily with the problem of the overdemandingness of duties, since the goal to 
minimise injustice remains open to different views on how that might be done while taking into 390 
consideration all parties that are recipients of justice. This second strategy faces less theoretical 
problems than the first one, although it also leaves it uncertain how justice to species will be 
interpreted and weighed against other kinds of claims of justice in public deliberation. 
 The third strategy differs from the first two. Ingrid Robeyns (2016) demonstrates that a great 
deal of capabilitarian scholarship extends beyond theorising justice to areas like comparative 395 
quality-of-life assessment, research on social phenomena using capabilities terminology, and 
theoretical and conceptual work on values other than justice. This opens up the possibility that the 
ECA can examine and apply the capabilities framework to species without making any claims of 
justice19. One way to apply the capability terminology to species (and nonhuman life generally) 
                                               
18  This departs from Nussbaum who attributes political theorists the role of a theorist–mediator ‘above’ citizens, 
rather than of a theorist–citizen who offers carefully constructed theoretical doctrines for citizens to be endorsed (or 
rejected) (Robeyns 2016, 410–411). Capabilities-based approaches allow for employing either of these roles.  
19  The third strategy leaves room for different answers on the normative implications of the species integrity. 
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would be to use it for a quality-of-life assessment, broadly understood: life including its nonhuman 400 
forms of presence. The development of our societies could be evaluated in relation to their impact 
on species’ (and other nonhuman) capabilities. When we look at the era of (post-)industrialisation 
and the expansion of human population, it is axiomatic that the life/ecological development index 
would look bad considering the rate of anthropogenic extinctions and environmental degradation. 
The environmental capabilities framework could also be applied for policy evaluation and for 405 
resolving the practical problems of species protection policies. Given that societies lack sufficient 
resources for taking measures to protect all possible species, capabilities framework provides one 
way to make prioritisations and resolve conflicts. Consider the proposal that devoting half of the 
Earth’s surface to protection could save 80 to 90 percent of current species (Wilson 2016; for doubts 
on the effectiveness of this proposal, see Sandler 2012, 55–74). From a capabilities perspective, this 410 
proposal appears promising. It would support the adaptive capacity of a considerable amount of 
species without conflicting with central human capabilities. Land protection would restrict land-
intensive human functionings but still allow the realisation of related capabilities, the equal land and 
property rights between humans, if protection measures are planned wisely. Another example comes 
from the question of how to prioritise protection measures when distinguishing between 415 
anthropogenic and other impacts that threaten species is not straightforward. Poaching involves a 
direct causal link between human actions and endangerment, but often the connection is more 
complicated, like with climate change. Ian A. Smith (2016, 124) proposes that the weight of our 
duty to save a species correlates positively with the strength of that causal link: if we had to choose 
between saving a species threatened by hunting and another endangered by climate change (the 420 
most attenuated causal link), we should prioritise saving the former. Although Smith defends his 
conclusion as logical, it is unconvincing. The ECA approaches the question differently. Saving a 
species from poaching is unlikely to save other species, except for those that directly depend on the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Although species are not considered as recipients of justice, they may be (and likely are) morally considerable anyway.  
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poached species. In contrast, saving a species threatened by climate-induced changes is likely to 
promote the protection of ecosystems and other vulnerable species in the same area. Hence, if we 425 
had to choose between saving a poached species and another threatened by climate change, the ECA 
would recommend saving the latter to protect the overall nonhuman flourishing more widely. In my 
view, this resolution is more plausible than Smith’s as soon as we look at the environmental 
problems from a broader perspective. Human activities are largely responsible for the majority of 
present extinctions and the aim should be to protect the whole of species diversity rather than treat 430 
species as if they were independent applicants for protection, even if the holistic protection strategy 
yields the risk of having ‘beneficiaries’ that are protected without having been harmed by humans. 
 This third strategy for applying the notion of species capabilities rejects the language of 
justice that was quite central for Schlosberg especially in his early treatment of the ECA 
(Schlosberg 2007). Yet it is perfectly compatible with the ECA project since capabilitarian research 435 
does not necessitate theorising justice (Robeyns 2016). Like the justice-oriented strategies, the third 
strategy illuminates the ways in which human activities undermine the integrity and flourishing of 
nonhuman life and helps address these concerns with the capabilities terminology. The third 
strategy deserves further research, as it avoids many of the problems regarding the first and second 
strategy but provides still equally useful conceptualisations for species protection and policy 440 
evaluation. 
 
Discussion 
  
 Whichever strategy one chooses for applying the notion of adaptive capacity as a central 445 
species capability, strategies have common features that demonstrate the overall advantages of the 
ECA. The ECA broadens the scope of our concern regarding species in contrast to views that focus 
narrowly on extinctions or species viability in a given time. For example, regardless of whether the 
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ECA is applied in a way that evokes some duties of justice or not, it challenges the assumption that 
the distribution of ecological space is merely an issue of social justice or equity between human 450 
beings (Peeters, Dirix and Sterckx 2014). Even the notion that social justice should be exercised 
within the limits of environmental sustainability is insufficient, because sustainability is usually 
defined with regard to future humans and does not involve ‘useless’ or unknown species. Another 
advantage is that the ECA avoids speciesism because its core features, integrity and adaptive 
capacity, are possessed by all species. Accounts that attach species only instrumental value 455 
disregard ‘useless’ species whose ecological functions can be replaced by other species. Even non-
instrumentalist approaches can be speciesist: Smith (2016, 81–94) views the intrinsic good of 
species as relying on sexual reproduction, which excludes some invertebrates, even some fish 
speciesf, and many plants from the sphere of concern. This is strongly counterintuitive: it sounds 
odd to claim that our duties to protect species do not concern a given fish species because its 460 
reproduction methods are asexual. 
 There are several unresolved questions that warrant further research. The theoretical issues 
involve the question whether species also possess other capabilities; identifying them is a 
multidisciplinary task that requires the utilisation of biological and conservation sciences. There 
may also be some genus-specific capabilities. Another important topic would be the status of 465 
subspecies. Following the Hennigian species concept, Smith (2016, 4) points out that subspecies are 
not real in the same sense as species are. Hence, the preservation of a subspecies like the Bengal 
tiger cannot rely on the same principles that evoke duties to species. I have made less strict 
ontological commitments but nevertheless argued that species integrity is linked to their status as 
real evolutionary groups. Subspecies comprise a heterogeneous category instead. Some subspecies 470 
are merely taxonomical, ‘made up’ by decisions based on differences in appearance. Others are less 
arbitrary, however. The Saimaa ringed seal (Pusa hispida saimensis), one of the most endangered 
mammals according to many conservationists, has been isolated for millennia and adapted to 
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freshwater ecosystems. It would have a hard time trying to survive in saltier waters where other 
ringed seals live, which clearly distinguishes it in a very real sense. The Saimaa ringed seal has its 475 
own integrity and identity and something unique is permanently lost if it becomes extinct. In any 
case, addressing species and subspecies protection in the non-academic realm requires contextual 
sensitivity rather than theoretically rigorous criteria that end up excluding all subspecies from the 
domain of concern (Oksanen 2016). 
 Practical applications of the ECA to species are numerous and resolving them has not been 480 
the aim of this paper, due to which I only want to mention two important topics for future reseach. 
One is genetic modification. It interferes with the self-regulative capacities of a species and has 
been argued to violate species integrity in the case of Homo sapiens (Miller 2013), but it may also 
improve the adaptive capacity. This raises the question whether (and what kind of) genetic 
modification would be morally justifiable to protect species from climate change20. Human-485 
controlled breeding of nonhuman species, including the creation of new subspecies, is another issue 
that calls for further evaluation. 
 The present paper has illustrated how the ECA can be applied to species and, in so doing, it 
has addressed questions that have received contradictory answers in earlier literature. Among the 
advantages of the ECA, as discussed in the previous section, are its holistic approach to species 490 
protection, and terminology in which all species merit protection – not just ‘useful’ or sexually 
reproducing ones. The paper has also pointed out, importantly, that there are three possible ways in 
which the ECA can actually be applied: the chosen strategy determines both the outcomes of such 
theorising and theoretical challenges that require addressing. The present paper is best viewed as an 
opening in a discourse that offers conceptual and theoretical tools for addressing human–species 495 
relations from a novel viewpoint, that of environmental capabilities. 
                                               
20  A related question is whether the ‘identity’ of a given species is lost in such practices and, particularly in the 
case of sentient beings, whether the individual well-being is promoted or hindered by genetic manipulation. For 
example, a manipulation method that would help save a species but make its future specimens suffer at the individual 
level, is unlikely permissible from any viewpoint. 
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